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Abstract We empirically test the association between conditional conservatism
and cost of equity capital. Conditional conservatism imposes stronger veriﬁcation
requirements for the recognition of economic gains than economic losses, resulting
in earnings that reﬂect losses faster than gains. This asymmetric reporting of gains
and losses is predicted to lower ﬁrm cost of equity capital by increasing bad news
reporting precision, thereby reducing information uncertainty (Guay and Verrecchia
2007) and the volatility of future stock prices (Suijs 2008). Using standard asset
pricing tests, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative relation between conditional conserva
tism and excess average stock returns over the period 1975 2003. This evidence is
corroborated by further tests on the association between conditional conservatism
and measures of implied cost of capital derived from analysts’ forecasts.
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11 Introduction
We examine the association between conditional accounting conservatism and cost
of equity capital. Conditional conservatism imposes stronger veriﬁcation require
ments for the recognition of economic gains than economic losses, generating
earnings that reﬂect bad news in a timelier fashion than good news. This is referred
to as the asymmetric timeliness of earnings (Basu 1997). Recent analytical work by
Guay and Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs (2008) coincides in arguing that asymmetric
reporting can affect ﬁrm’s market value and its cost of equity capital. These authors
analytically demonstrate that more precise bad news reporting reduces (1) the
discount that investors apply to ﬁrm value in the presence of uncertainty and (2) the
volatility of future stock prices (and thus shareholders’ investment risk). In this
paper, we empirically test this proposition and provide evidence on the negative
association between asymmetric reporting and cost of equity capital.
Guay and Verrecchia (2007) articulate the mechanism underlying the predicted
relation between conditional conservatism and cost of capital. They show that ﬁrm
commitment to timely reporting of low realizations leads to full disclosure of
information and lower cost of capital. In their model, uncertainty about the
information structure leads to the appearance of risk premiums as investors place
less weight on imprecise information signals (Merton 1987; Easley and O’Hara
2004; Lambert et al. 2008), and full disclosure of information reduces the
uncertainty about expected future cash ﬂows, lowering cost of capital. Full
disclosure is achieved via timely recognition of difﬁcult to verify losses in the
audited ﬁnancial statements combined with voluntary strategic disclosure of good
news through various other information channels, which are expected to ﬂourish in
the presence of conservative reporting (LaFond and Watts 2008).
Suijs (2008) suggests an alternative link between ﬁrm reporting policy and cost
of capital. In his model, overlapping generations of shareholders invest in a ﬁrm
with a life cycle that exceeds shareholders’ investment horizons. In such a setting, it
is the volatility of ﬁrm future prices that determines investment risk and not the
volatility of future cash ﬂows. As a result, ﬁrm reporting policies become a primary
determinant of investment risk. More informative disclosure of bad news reduces
the cost of capital by improving risk sharing across generations of investors. Suijs
(2008) demonstrates that an asymmetric reporting system that reports bad news
more precisely than good news results in higher ﬁrm value and more efﬁcient risk
sharing.
While regulators and corporate executives appear to believe that accounting
decisions can have cost of capital effects (Levitt 1998; Graham et al. 2005), recent
work on the association between ﬁnancial information attributes and cost of capital
presents mixed theories and conﬂicting evidence (Easley and O’Hara 2004; Lambert
et al. 2007; Core et al. 2008; Hughes et al. 2009). We add to this prior literature by
empirically testing the proposition in Guay and Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs (2008)
that conditional conservatism leads to lower cost of capital.
1 With the exception of
1 For brevity, we sometimes refer to conditional conservatism simply as conservatism. Similarly, we use
the terms cost of capital and cost of equity capital interchangeably.
2some limited evidence in Francis et al. (2004), no prior study has analyzed the
association between conditional conservatism and cost of capital.
Using a large sample of US ﬁrms for the period 1975 2003, we create and
validate a ﬁrm speciﬁc measure of conservatism (Conservatism) based on the work
of Callen et al. (2010). We use this proxy in asset pricing regressions to test whether
more conditionally conservative ﬁrms experience lower expected stock returns. The
asset pricing tests yield the following key evidence. We document a signiﬁcant and
negative coefﬁcient on the Conservatism portfolio in a ﬁrm speciﬁc time series
regression that correlates returns contemporaneously with Conservatism, the three
Fama and French (1993) risk factors (beta, size, and book to market) and a
momentum factor (Carhart 1997). Second, we examine whether a strategy that buys
(sells) ﬁrms with high (low) Conservatism earns abnormal returns. We ﬁnd that the
Conservatism hedge portfolio strategy yields signiﬁcantly negative abnormal excess
returns. Finally, we build a Conservatism mimicking portfolio called AMC
(Aggressive minus Conservative) by subtracting each month the value weighted
return of stocks in the highest three deciles of Conservatism from the value
weighted return of stocks in the lowest three deciles of Conservatism. Using a two
stage cross sectional regression technique extensively used in the ﬁnance literature,
we show that the AMC factor loading is signiﬁcantly positive on a cross sectional
regression of portfolio returns on AMC, momentum, and the three Fama and French
factor loadings.
We check the robustness of our ﬁndings in several ways. First, we assess the
construct validity of the Callen et al. (2010) conservatism proxy. Second, we
provide empirical evidence consistent with the analytical frameworks of Guay and
Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs (2008) that conditional conservatism is associated to
lower earnings forecast errors and lower future returns volatility. Finally, following
prior work by Francis et al. (2004), among others, we assess the association between
conservatism and cost of capital as measured by the expected return of a ﬁrm’s stock
implicit in analysts’ forecasts. To do so, we regress a measure of implied cost of
capital on Conservatism, risk proxies, and controls for the determinants of
conditional conservatism. This provides additional indirect evidence of the link
between conditional conservatism and cost of equity. The results from these tests
corroborate the ﬁndings from the asset pricing tests.
Overall, we document a robust negative association between conditional
conservatism and cost of capital, consistent with the propositions in Guay and
Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs (2008). Our results add to the recent stream of
empirical literature on the cost of capital effects of variation in accounting quality
2
and contribute to a ﬂourishing stream of empirical research in accounting
conservatism that shows that conditional conservatism is associated to positive
economic outcomes (Bushman et al. 2007; Ahmed and Duellman 2008; LaFond and
2 See Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Battacharya et al. (2003), Francis et al. (2004, 2005),
Hribar and Jenkins (2004), Aboody et al. (2005), Barth et al. (2010), Kravet and Shevlin (2007), McInnis
(2010), Francis et al. (2008), Core et al. (2008), Daske et al. (2008). The evidence presented by this
literature is somewhat mixed, which is partly attributable to the different empirical methods used, as well
as the use of accounting quality proxies, such as disclosure, transparency or income smoothing, with a
tenuous link with information precision about future cash ﬂows.
3Watts 2008; Francis and Martin 2010). The reported evidence sheds some additional
light on the regulatory debate on whether conservatism should be excluded from the
desirable qualitative characteristics of accounting information.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the
discussion on the expected relation between conservatism and cost of equity and
reviews prior work on the topic. Section 3 describes the asset pricing tests to
empirically analyze this relation, the empirical measure of conditional conservatism
that we use in our tests, and how we validate this conservatism measure. Section 4
presents the data and the empirical results. Section 5 discusses the robustness tests.
Finally, Section 6 summarizes the ﬁndings and concludes.
2 The association between conditional conservatism and cost of capital
Conditional conservatism, deﬁned following Basu (1997) as the implementation of
more stringent veriﬁability criteria for the recognition of good news than bad news
in earnings, is one of the most pervasive characteristics of accounting information.
This pervasiveness is explained by the expected beneﬁts of conditional conserva
tism for the different parties to the ﬁrm. Prior literature on conservatism highlights
the beneﬁts of conservatism in contracting (Watts 2003). Conditional conservatism
acts as a governance mechanism that beneﬁts both debt and equity holders and
increases ﬁrm value.
3 Watts (2003) maintains that this increase in ﬁrm value is
achieved by minimizing contracting, litigation and regulatory and taxation costs. In
addition to these contracting beneﬁts of conservatism, LaFond and Watts (2008)
argue that conditional conservatism is expected to ‘‘lower information asymmetry
between managers and outside investors’’ and that ‘‘conservative ﬁnancial reports
are likely to generate a more informed capital market.’’
4
Furthering our understanding of the role of conditional conservatism in
improving the functioning of capital markets, Guay and Verrecchia (2007) make
the argument that the preference for an asymmetric reporting system ‘‘lies in the
discount the market applies to uncertainty in the absence of information.’’
5 They
argue that managers have incentives to act strategically and disclose information
only on good prospects and high realizations (Dye 2001). In the absence of
regulatory enforcement of conservative reporting, managers recognize good news in
earnings on a timely basis and voluntarily disclose higher bounds for future
expected cash ﬂows. However, they shy away from full disclosure by deferring the
recognition of difﬁcult to verify losses and withholding information about low
realizations of expected future cash ﬂows. Guay and Verrecchia (2007) develop a
model where markets anticipate strategic disclosure and apply a discount if there is
certainty that management is withholding information. Against this backdrop, when
3 Consistent with this view, Beekes et al. (2004), Ahmed and Duellman (2007), and Garcı ´a Lara et al.
(2009a) show that better governed ﬁrms report more conditionally conservative numbers, while the work
of Ball et al. (2008) conﬁrms that both debt and equity markets demand conservative accounting.
4 See pages 448 and 458 in LaFond and Watts (2008).
5 Guay and Verrecchia (2007) page 3.
4conservative reporting is enforced, the market can be certain that no information is
withheld.
Guay and Verrecchia (2007) analytically demonstrate that a commitment to an
asymmetric reporting system permits attaining full disclosure. Good and bad news is
disclosed on a timely basis, although through different communication channels.
Bad news is recognized in the income statement, while good news is disclosed
through other channels like the notes to the ﬁnancial statements, conference calls,
etc. These sources of information ﬂourish under conservatism (LaFond and Watts
2008). Under full disclosure, market participants have timely information both on
the lower and upper bounds of ﬁrm future cash ﬂows. This reduces information
uncertainty and increases the precision with which investors can assess ﬁrm future
cash ﬂows, minimizing the discount markets apply to ﬁrm value. Consistent with
this view, Lambert et al. (2007, 2008) show that, more generally, by improving
accounting information quality, managers increase the precision with which market
participants can assess ﬁrm future cash ﬂows and thus reduce cost of capital. They
demonstrate that this effect is not diversiﬁable, even in large economies. Along
these lines, it is not unreasonable to assume that conservatism is so embedded into
ﬁnancial reporting practices that diversiﬁcation may not be possible.
Conditional conservatism is also expected to increase ﬁrm value indirectly
through improved monitoring and contracting and reduced litigation costs. As
shown by Guay and Verrecchia (2007) conservatism increases ﬁrm value (1) by
improving corporate governance (which, in turn, allows early removal of poorly
performing managers, prevents managers from engaging in self serving projects and
expropriating investors, improves ﬁrm investment efﬁciency, etc.), (2) by reducing
agency costs arising from compensation and debt contracting, and (3) by reducing
litigation costs. These arguments link to the work in Lambert et al. (2007), who
show that there is also an indirect link between information quality and cost of
equity.
Finally, Suijs (2008) provides an alternative link between conservatism,
information precision, and cost of capital. He builds a model of overlapping
generations of shareholders that invest in a ﬁrm with a life cycle that exceeds
shareholders’ investment horizons. In that setting, investment risk is determined by
the dispersion of future stock prices and not by the volatility of future cash ﬂows.
Suijs (2008) demonstrates that an asymmetric reporting system that reports bad
news more precisely than good news results in higher ﬁrm value and more efﬁcient
risk sharing amongst generations of investors. Suijs argues that ﬁrm reporting
policies are a primary determinant of investment risk and that a conservative
reporting system serves to reduce this risk, thereby lowering ﬁrm cost of capital.
There has been little empirical research on this topic. Only the work of Francis
et al. (2004) examines the relation between cost of equity capital and conditional
conservatism at the ﬁrm year level. They study the link between cost of capital and
seven earnings attributes: accrual quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness,
value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism. They hypothesize and ﬁnd that,
generally, more favorable values of the individual earnings attributes are associated
with lower cost of capital, after controlling for known risks factors and innate
determinants of the earnings attributes. However, they do not ﬁnd evidence of an
5association between conservatism and cost of equity. Their result of no relation is
probably driven by measurement error in their ﬁrm level proxy of conservatism, as
demonstrated by Givoly et al. (2007), and by the use of tests that rely solely on the
use of ex ante cost of capital estimates that have been shown to be unduly affected
by optimism in analysts’ earnings forecasts (Easton and Sommers 2007). More
recently, Li (2009) studies the effect of conditional conservatism on the cost of debt
and equity capital at the country level. Using an empirical design based on the
classical Basu (1997) model and ex ante measures of the cost of equity, she ﬁnds
that ﬁrms from countries with more conservative ﬁnancial reporting systems have
signiﬁcantly lower cost of debt and equity, after controlling for differences in legal
institutions and securities regulations. We depart from Francis et al. (2004) and Li
(2009) in three main ways: (a) we use a ﬁrm level measure of conditional
conservatism (as in Callen et al. 2010) to overcome the possible biases in the Basu
(1997) measure described by Dietrich et al. (2007), Givoly et al. (2007) and
Patatoukas and Thomas (2009); (b) we do not rely on ex ante measures of the cost of
equity; and (c) we use formal asset pricing tests widely used in the ﬁnance literature.
3 Research design
Aboody et al. (2005), Francis et al. (2005), Core et al. (2008), Francis et al. (2008),
and McInnis (2010) use asset pricing tests to assess whether accounting choice
affects ﬁrm cost of capital. We follow their approach and study (1) whether
conditional conservatism is associated with future ﬁrm speciﬁc and portfolio excess
returns and (2) whether conditional conservatism is a priced factor in a Fama and
French (1993) factor model setting, using the two stage cross sectional regression
method common in the ﬁnance literature after Fama and MacBeth (1973).
3.1 Conditional conservatism and future excess returns
As a ﬁrst test, we study whether conditional conservatism predicts future excess
returns. To do so, we regress ﬁrm speciﬁc future excess returns on ﬁrm
characteristics and conditional conservatism (Conservatism). We match annual
estimates of beta, size, book to market, momentum, and Conservatism to monthly
returns in the next 12 months starting 4 months after the ﬁscal year end. That is, for
December ﬁscal year ends we collect monthly returns from April of year t ? 1t o
March of year t ? 2. The model is run monthly as follows:
Ri;tþ1 RF;tþ1 ¼a þ b1 Betat þ b2 Sizet þ b3 BMt þ b4 Momentumt
þ b5 Conservatismt þ lt
ð1Þ
where monthly excess returns (Ri,t?1 RF,t?1) are measured in percentages and are
calculated as the raw stock return less the risk free rate. The raw stock return is
obtained from the CRSP monthly stock ﬁle, and the risk free rate is the return on the
1 month T bill obtained from the Fama French ﬁles at WRDS. Beta is the slope
coefﬁcient from a regression of a ﬁrm’s monthly excess returns on the monthly
6value weighted market excess return over a rolling 60 month window ending in the
current ﬁscal year. Size is the natural log of the market value of equity measured at
the end of the year. BM is the log of the book to market value of equity ratio.
Momentum is the buy and hold return for the 11 month period ending 1 month prior
to the end of the year. We include momentum in all our tests because high
conservatism ﬁrms are more likely to have negative returns, and we want to ensure
that the results are not an artifact of momentum. Conservatism is the monthly decile
ranks of the three year average of the ﬁrm year speciﬁc proxy of conditional
conservatism developed in Callen et al. (2010). Section 3.3 below provides details
on the calculation and validation of Conservatism as a ﬁrm speciﬁc proxy for
conditional conservatism. In model (1) the main coefﬁcient of interest is b5.I f
conditional conservatism lowers cost of equity capital, this will lead to lower future
excess returns and a signiﬁcantly negative b5 coefﬁcient.
As a second test, we follow a similar approach to the one in Gompers et al.
(2003), Aboody et al. (2005), Core et al. (2008) and Francis et al. (2008); and test
whether an investment strategy that buys (sells) ﬁrms in the decile with the largest
(smallest) conditional conservatism earns negative abnormal returns. To perform
this test, each month, from Jan. 1, 1976 to Dec. 31, 2004 (348 months), all ﬁrm
years in the sample are ranked into 10 deciles based on their Conservatism value.
Portfolios of stocks are then formed for each Conservatism decile. Then, for every
Conservatism decile, we estimate the following time series regression of monthly
value weighted portfolio returns on the three Fama and French (1993) factors and a
momentum factor:
RP;t RF;t ¼a þ b1 RM;t RF;t

þ b2 SMBt
þ b3 HMLt þ b4 UMDt þ lt
ð2Þ
where RP RF equals the value weighted return on the portfolios less the risk free
rate. RM RF is the excess return on the value weighted market portfolio. SML is
the value weighted size mimicking portfolio return. HML is the value weighted
BM mimicking portfolio return. UMD is the value weighted momentum mimicking
portfolio. RM RF, SMB, HML, and UMD are obtained directly from WRDS.
Monthly returns are measured in percentages. The main coefﬁcient of interest in
Eq. 2 is the intercept. If the model is well speciﬁed, the intercept should be very
close to zero and insigniﬁcant. However, if the variable used to create the portfolios
is priced by the market (or the market is mispricing the information, as in Sloan
1996), then the intercept should be signiﬁcantly different from zero. The intercept of
the hedge portfolio indicates whether abnormal returns can be obtained buying and
selling short the extreme portfolios formed with the variable of interest (in this case,
conservatism). If conservatism results in lower cost of capital, we expect the
intercept a of the hedge portfolio to be signiﬁcantly negative.
3.2 Two stage cross sectional regressions
The prior tests do not allow us to disentangle whether market participants reward
conditionally conservative ﬁrms or whether they do not fully impound differences in
7conditional conservatism into prices. To test whether conservatism is a priced risk
factor, we use a two stage cross sectional regression approach, where we regress the
excess returns of a set of test assets on the Fama French risk factors betas, a
momentum beta, and the beta of a conservatism factor (Cochrane 2005). The idea is
to check whether the hypothesized factor contributes to explain the cross section of
asset returns. Using the prior data, each month, we form a factor mimicking
portfolio called AMC (Aggressive minus Conservative). To calculate AMC, at the
beginning of every month, we sort ﬁrms into Conservatism deciles. For example, for
April of year t, ﬁrms are ranked into deciles based on the Conservatism value
calculated using annual data for ﬁscal year ends between January and December of
year t 1. Monthly returns of each decile portfolio are calculated as the value
weighted average of excess returns of the ﬁrms in the portfolio. To construct AMC,
each month, the value weighted return of stocks in the highest three deciles of
Conservatism is subtracted from the value weighted return on stocks in the lowest
three deciles of Conservatism. That is, we buy the three deciles with the least
conservative ﬁrms and sell the three deciles with the most conservative ﬁrms. We
use value weighted portfolios to reduce the upward biases in returns that arise when
rebalancing equal weight portfolios (Blume and Stambaugh 1983).
In the ﬁrst stage of the test, we incorporate the AMC factor mimicking portfolio
to the Fama and French (1993) three factor model plus a momentum factor to
estimate the betas from each factor. The augmented model is as follows:
RP;t RF;t ¼a þ bRM RF RM;t RF;t

þ bSMB SMBt þ bHML HMLt
þ bUMDUMDt þ bAMC AMCt þ lt
ð3Þ
In the second stage, we regress mean excess returns on the risk factor betas
estimated from Eq. 3 using the following model:
RP;t RF;t ¼ a þ d1^ bRM RF þ d2^ bSMB þ d3^ bHML þ d4^ bUMD þ d5^ bAMC þ lt ð4Þ
Because betas in the second stage regression are estimated betas (derived from
Eq. 3), there is a potential error in variables problem that may bias the standard
errors of the second stage regression coefﬁcients. To mitigate this concern, we
apply the correction proposed by Shanken (1992) to adjust for the overstated
precision of the Fama MacBeth standard errors. Equation (3) is estimated in time
series at the portfolio level. We follow standard ﬁnance literature and use as test
assets the 25 size and book to market portfolios created by Fama and French
(1993).
6 These 25 portfolios have become the standard benchmark in testing
competing asset pricing models (Petkova 2006). These test assets are extremely
challenging and for this reason they are widely used. We also use as test assets a set
of 25 portfolios from the intersection of the quintiles of Size with the quintiles of
Momentum.
7 If conditional conservatism is a priced risk factor, then, portfolios with
a larger ^ bAMC should obtain larger abnormal returns. If this is the case, the d5
coefﬁcient in Eq. 4 is predicted to be signiﬁcantly positive.
6 The data are available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
7 In additional robustness tests, we also use 25 size-conservatism portfolios and 100 conservatism
portfolios.
83.3 Developing and assessing the construct validity of a ﬁrm speciﬁc measure
of conditional conservatism (Conservatism)
We construct our empirical proxy of conditional conservatism based on the ﬁrm
year speciﬁc ratio of conditional conservatism (CR) developed by Callen et al.
(2010).
8 CR captures the percentage of a shock to current and future ﬁrm earnings
that is incorporated into current period unexpected earnings. Callen et al. (2010)
base their measure on the Vuolteenaho (2002) return decomposition model.
Vuolteenaho (2002) shows that shocks to returns can be decomposed into: (1)
shocks to current and future dividends (or cash ﬂows) and (2) shocks to current and
future discount rates. Replacing dividends with earnings through the clean surplus
relation, shocks to returns can be expressed in terms of shocks to current and
expected future earnings and shocks to current and future discount rates:
rt Et 1 rt ðÞ ¼ Ne Nr ð5Þ
where r is the market rate of return, Ne is earnings news (shocks), and Nr is discount
rates news (shocks). The above equation shows that unexpected revision to current
stock returns increases with earnings news and decreases with discount rate news.
CR measures the relation between earnings news (Ne) and current period
unexpected earnings. It captures the fact that the asymmetric properties of
conservative accounting, along with the existence of alternative non accounting
sources of information, generate nonlinear relations between revisions to equity
returns and earnings news. CR measures the asymmetry between gain and loss
recognition timeliness because in the case of adverse earnings news, a higher
proportion of the news is recognized in current earnings.
To obtain proxies for earnings news and current period unexpected earnings,
Callen et al. implement the Vuolteenaho (2002) decomposition using a log linear
vector autoregressive (VAR) model consisting of the following system of equations,
where the ﬁrm subscript, i, is understood:
rt ¼ a1rt 1 þ a2roet 1 þ a3bmt 1 þ g1t ð6Þ
roet ¼ b1rt 1 þ b2roet 1 þ b3bmt 1 þ g2t ð7Þ
bmt ¼ d1rt 1 þ d2roet 1 þ d3bmt 1 þ g3t ð8Þ
using the VAR matrix of estimated coefﬁcients from the system of Eqs. 6, 7, and 8
and the vectors of residuals g, Callen et al. arrive at the following expressions for
the unexpected shock to returns, discount rate news (Nr), and earnings news (Ne):
rt Et 1 rt ðÞ ¼ g1;t ð9Þ
Nrt ¼ e1’qAðI qAÞ
 1 gi;t ð10Þ
8 There is an alternative ﬁrm-year speciﬁc measure of conservatism (c-score) developed by Khan and
Watts (2009). Although it is a perfectly valid measure, we choose not to use c-score in our tests because it
is a linear combination of size, market-to-book, and leverage. These three variables are proxies for risk
and the results could be attributed to c-score being a proxy for these three risk factors.
9Net ¼ e2’ðI qAÞ
 1 gi;t ð11Þ
where A is the matrix of estimated coefﬁcients from system of Eqs. 6, 7, and 8. e1’
and e2’ are vectors equal to [1, 0, 0] and [0, 1, 0] respectively. I is the identity
matrix. q is a constant equal to 0.967, and gi,t [g1i,t, g2i,t, g3i,t]’. Finally, taking
the residuals from Eq. 7 as their proxy for current period unexpected earnings, they
empirically estimate the level of conditional conservatism as the ratio of unexpected
current earnings to total earnings news:
CRi;t ¼ g2i;t=Nei;t ð12Þ
Larger values of CR indicate greater conditional conservatism: in the event of a
negative earnings shock, a larger part of the earnings shock (Ne) is reﬂected in
current period unexpected earnings (g2). In the extreme (CR 1), current period
unexpected earnings fully reﬂect the earnings shock. Thus the ratio measures the
proportion of the total shock to current and expected future earnings (cash ﬂows)
recognized in current year earnings. As stated in Callen et al. (2010), ‘‘by this
criterion, ﬁrm A is more conservative than ﬁrm B, if for a given negative (positive)
shock to current and future expected cash ﬂows, ﬁrm A recognizes more (less) of the
shock in current year earnings than does ﬁrm B.’’
To compute CR we follow scrupulously the estimation details described in Callen
et al. (2010). In particular, the return variable r equals the log of one plus the annual
return ending 3 months after closing minus the log of one plus the annualized three
month T bill rate. The earnings variable roe is the log of one plus ROE minus the
log of one plus the annualized 3 month T bill rate. ROE is computed as income
before extraordinary items scaled by beginning book value of equity. The book to
market variable bm equals the log of the book to market ratio at year end. To control
for industry effects, the VAR system is estimated for each Fama and French (1997)
industry group using weighted least squares with one pooled regression per system
equation. Each annual cross section is weighted equally by deﬂating the data by the
number of ﬁrms in that year and all variables in the system are demeaned.
9 Finally,
we remove ﬁrms with market value of equity below $10 million, ﬁnancial ﬁrms
(SIC 6000 6999), and observations in the top and bottom 1% of each variable. As in
Callen et al. (2010), we drop ﬁrm year observations with a negative CR.
3.3.1 Assessment of the construct validity of the conservatism proxy
To capture persistence in ﬁrms’ reporting choices, our conservatism proxy
(Conservatism) is measured as the three year average of CR.
10 To assess the
validity of Conservatism as a proxy for conditional conservatism, we replicate
the procedures and variable measurement in Callen et al. (2010) and construct the
3 year averages of CR for all non ﬁnancial ﬁrms with the necessary data available in
9 The precise estimation details are available in Callen and Segal (2009). We also appreciate the
technical assistance provided by Dan Segal.
10 All our inferences remain unchanged if we set the value of Conservatism equal to the ﬁrm-year
speciﬁc CR. For the single-year CR, our descriptive statistics are virtually identical to those reported in
Callen et al. (2010).
10Compustat and CRSP for the period 1975 2003. Our resulting sample contains
54,389 ﬁrm year observations, after deleting the top and bottom percentiles of CR.
Table 1 contains sample descriptive statistics. Although our sample differs from the
one used by Callen et al. (2010) and we measure the conservatism ratio as a 3 year
average, our descriptive evidence is very similar to what they report. The mean
(median) Conservatism is 0.47 (0.39) for our sample, while the mean (median) CR
is 0.51 (0.39) in the sample used by Callen et al., which spans the period 1962
2006. The interpretation of Conservatism is that, on average, a 47% of the shock to
current and future earnings (the earnings news, Ne) is incorporated into current
unexpected earnings. As expected, total accruals are on average negative, due to the
effect of depreciation and amortization charges. The market to book ratio is well
above one, suggesting the presence of unconditional conservatism. Special items are
on average negative, consistent with the results in Callen et al. (2010).
To assess the validity of our proxy, we regress the decile ranks of Conservatism
on the economic determinants of conditional conservatism. In particular, we expect
conditional conservatism to be positively related to (1) contracting pressures and (2)
litigation risk and negatively related to (3) unconditional conservatism, (4) total
accruals, and (5) special items.
As highlighted by Watts (2003) and demonstrated by Qiang (2007), Ball et al.
(2008), and Garcı ´a Lara et al. (2009b), among others, debt contracting is one of the
main determinants of conditional conservatism. We use leverage as a proxy for the
debt related pressures faced by the ﬁrm. Consequently, if Conservatism is a good
proxy for conditional conservatism we expect a positive association between our
conservatism measure and leverage. Regarding litigation risk, Watts (2003) points
at litigation risk as one of the main determinants of conditional conservatism, and
empirical evidence by Qiang (2007) and Garcı ´a Lara et al. (2009b) supports this
hypothesis using different proxies for conditional conservatism and litigation risk.
As a proxy for equity contracting pressures and litigation risk, we follow Callen
et al. (2010) and use the standard deviation of returns. This is a measure of operating
risk. Firms with higher operational uncertainty are expected to be subject to greater
shareholder monitoring and litigation risk. Thus, if Conservatism correctly captures
variation in conditional conservatism, we should ﬁnd a positive association between
the standard deviation of returns and Conservatism. With respect to unconditional
conservatism, we follow most of prior research and measure it using the market to
book ratio. As an additional proxy for unconditional conservatism that captures ex
ante conservative accounting choices, we also employ the Penman and Zhang
(2002) C score. Following Beaver and Ryan (2005), we expect a negative
association between conditional and unconditional conservatism. Finally, prior
literature expects more conditionally conservative ﬁrms to have more negative
average accruals (Givoly and Hayn 2000) and conditional conservatism to be also
applied through special items (Pope and Walker 1999). Thus we expect a negative
association between total accruals and Conservatism and between special items and
Conservatism.
We measure these variables as follows: leverage is the ratio of interest bearing
debt to total assets. Returns volatility is the three year average of the standard
deviation of 1 year of daily stock returns. Market to book is the market to book
11value of equity ratio. Total accruals equals [(Dcurrent assets Dcash) (Dcurrent
liabilities Dshort term debt) depreciation]/average assets. Special items equal
special items scaled by average total assets. Finally, we also control for size, deﬁned
as the log of the market value of equity.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the conservatism proxy and the variables of interest for the construct-
validity tests
Variable description Mean St. Dev p25 p50 p75
Conservatism 0.47 0.36 0.28 0.39 0.54
Leverage 0.22 0.17 0.07 0.21 0.34
Total accruals 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.01
Market-to-book 2.15 1.69 1.08 1.65 2.61
Special items 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
Returns volatility 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Size 5.33 1.76 3.92 5.10 6.56
Beta 1.09 0.59 0.71 1.05 1.41
BM 0.54 0.65 0.96 0.50 0.08
Momentum 0.17 0.48 0.13 0.10 0.36
PZ C-score 0.21 0.53 0.00 0.05 0.21
Bid-Ask spread 3.60 2.14 2.07 3.05 4.61
CFO volatility 7.56 8.17 3.90 6.10 9.23
Smoothing 0.62 0.42 0.81 0.54 0.33
Forecast error 0.29 0.67 0.03 0.07 0.22
Forecast variability 0.08 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.10
The sample contains 54,389 ﬁrm-year observations for the period 1975–2003. Conservatism is the three-
year average of the ﬁrm-year speciﬁc proxy of conditional conservatism developed by Callen et al.
(2010). Unless otherwise indicated, the following variables are measured at the end of the ﬁscal year.
Leverage is the ratio of interest-bearing debt to total assets. Total accruals equals [(Dcurrent assets
Dcash) (Dcurrent liabilities Dshort term debt) depreciation]/average assets. Market-to-book is
the market-to-book value of equity ratio. Special items equal special items scaled by average total assets.
Returns volatility is the three-year average of the standard deviation of 1 year of daily stock returns. Size
is the log of the market value of equity. Beta is the slope coefﬁcient from the regression of a ﬁrm’s
monthly excess returns on the monthly value-weighted market excess return (from the CRSP monthly
index ﬁle) over a rolling 60-month (minimum 24 months) window ending in the current ﬁscal year. BM is
the log of the book-to-market value of equity ratio. Momentum is the buy and hold return for the 11-
month period ending 1 month prior to at the end of the year. PZ C-score is the measure of unconditional
conservatism developed by Penman and Zhang (2002) that captures the ﬁrm’s choice of accounting
methods that keep the book value of net assets relatively low (only available for 43,913 observations).
Bid-Ask spread is the average daily bid-ask spread over the ﬁscal year scaled by price, as a percentage.
CFO volatility is the standard deviation of the ﬁrm’s rolling 10 year cash ﬂows from operations scaled by
beginning total assets, as a percentage. Smoothing is the ratio of earnings volatility to CFO volatility
multiplied by 1, where earnings volatility is the standard deviation of the ﬁrm’s rolling ten-year
earnings before extraordinary items scaled by beginning total assets (Smoothing and CFO volatility are
only available for 25,628 observations). Forecast error is the earnings-per-share forecast error measured
as the absolute value of the difference between the mean forecast EPS and the actual EPS, scaled by the
actual EPS. The forecast is taken in the 10th month of the ﬁscal year from IBES summary data. Forecast
variability is the standard deviation of the earnings forecasts. We impose a minimum of three earnings
forecasts per ﬁrm-year. Forecast error and Forecast variability are only available for 15,388 observations.
Forecast error is winsorized at the 95th percentile. The rest of continuous variables are winsorized
annually at the 1st and 99th percentiles to avoid the effect of inﬂuential observations
12Table 2 presents the results of a regression of the decile ranks of Conservatism on
leverage, total accruals, the market to book ratio, special items, the standard
deviation of returns, size, and the Penman and Zhang (2002) C Score. We employ
deciles of Conservatism to reduce measurement error, but the inferences are similar
when we use Conservatism. Following Petersen (2009), we estimate this regression
in a pooled fashion and report t statistics based on standard errors that are robust to
heteroskedasticity, serial and cross sectional correlation with a two dimensional
cluster at the ﬁrm and year level.
11 All coefﬁcient estimates are signiﬁcant except
size, for which we did not have an ex ante prediction, given that prior literature
offers conﬂicting views on the relation between ﬁrm size and conditional
conservatism. All other coefﬁcients behave as expected: we ﬁnd a negative
coefﬁcient for total accruals, market to book ratio, special items, and unconditional
conservatism (as measured through the C Score) and a positive coefﬁcient for
leverage and the standard deviation of returns.
12 These results suggest that
Conservatism is a good proxy for conditional conservatism.
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Table 2 Construct-validity tests of the conservatism proxy
Regression of decile rankings of Conservatism on several determinants of conservatism
Dep. var: Conservatism deciles Coeff. t-stat p-val Coeff. t-stat p-val
Constant 5.14 39.51 0.00 5.11 36.45 0.00
Leverage 1.64 12.44 0.00 1.44 10.50 0.00
Total accruals 2.19 12.27 0.00 2.20 11.54 0.00
Market-to-book 0.18 8.06 0.00 0.16 6.96 0.00
Special items 3.52 3.80 0.00 3.82 4.36 0.00
Returns volatility 6.26 2.60 0.01 8.24 3.31 0.00
Size 0.01 0.46 0.64 0.01 0.56 0.57
PZ C-score 0.19 3.36 0.00
R-sqr 0.03 0.03
Nobs 54,389 43,913
The dependent variable is the annual decile rankings of Conservatism. The rest of variables are deﬁned in
Table 1
Coefﬁcients are based on pooled regressions. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the
ﬁrm and year level (Petersen 2009), which are robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-ﬁrm serial
correlation. All the p-values are based on two-tailed tests
11 We obtain similar inferences using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. The results are also
robust to the inclusion of industry indicator variables.
12 Notice that special items are on average negative. Higher special items are associated with higher
conservatism. Therefore, the coefﬁcient on special items is expected to be negative.
13 In additional tests to validate Conservatism, we create four portfolios of ﬁrms ranked according to
Conservatism. For each portfolio, we estimate the cross-sectional models of (a) asymmetric persistence in
income changes (Basu 1997; Ball and Shivakumar 2005) and (b) asymmetric earnings timeliness to good
and bad news (Basu 1997). Unreported results show that conservatism measures drawn from these models
increase as we move from the least to the most conservative portfolio according to our Conservatism
measure, conﬁrming that our measure of conditional conservatism correctly classiﬁes ﬁrms according to
their level of conservative accounting.
134 Asset-pricing tests data and results
We use Compustat to extract accounting data and CRSP to extract stock market
data. Our sample period spans 29 years, t 1976 2004 (348 months from January
1976 to December 2004).
14 Table 3 reports descriptive evidence of the data used to
run the asset pricing tests. Panels A and B show summary statistics of the three
Fama French factors (RM RF, SMB and HML), a momentum factor (UMD), and
the conservatism factor AMC (Aggressive minus Conservative). AMC is the factor
mimicking portfolio for conditional conservatism. To construct AMC, each month,
the value weighted return of stocks in the highest three deciles of Conservatism is
subtracted from the value weighted return on stocks in the lowest three deciles of
Conservatism. RM RF, SMB, HML, and UMD are obtained directly from the
Fama French database on WRDS.
Table 3 Asset pricing tests—descriptive statistics
Panel A: Summary statistics of the factors
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev. Min P50 Max t-stat p-val
RM RF 348 0.63 4.48 23.13 1.01 12.43 2.63 0.01
SMB 348 0.31 3.27 16.70 0.28 22.18 1.76 0.08
HML 348 0.42 3.13 12.80 0.39 13.80 2.51 0.01
UMD 348 0.88 4.26 25.05 0.99 18.40 3.87 0.00
AMC 348 0.20 1.25 4.13 0.16 4.20 2.99 0.00
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix of the factors





UMD 0.01 0.15 0.13
0.85 0.01 0.01
AMC 0.08 0.12 0.27 0.13
0.12 0.03 \.0001 0.01
The sample covers the months from Jan. 1, 1976 to Dec. 31, 2004. The panels show summary statistics of
the three Fama–French factors, a momentum factor UMD, and a conservatism factor AMC. RM RF is
excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio. SML is the value-weighted size-mimicking port-
folio return. HML is the value-weighted BM-mimicking portfolio return. UMD is the value-weighted
momentum-mimicking portfolio return. RM RF, SMB, HML, and UMD are obtained directly from
WRDS. AMC (Aggressive minus Conservative) is a factor-mimicking portfolio for conditional conser-
vatism. To construct AMC, each month, the value-weighted return of stocks in the highest three deciles of
Conservatism is subtracted from the value-weighted return on stocks in the lowest three deciles of
Conservatism. Italic values indicate p-values
14 The ﬁrst year is 1976 because we start measuring Conservatism in the previous year.
14Table 3 Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the AMC factor and for the three
Fama French factors and the momentum factor. This evidence permits examining
whether there is a signiﬁcant unconditional time series mean risk premium on the
factors. The mean monthly time series premium for the AMC factor of 0.20%
implies a mean annual risk premium of about 2.5%, which is statistically different
from zero. This evidence on the time series mean of the AMC factor provides an
initial estimate of the factor premium. The fact that AMC is signiﬁcant indicates
that AMC is likely to be priced (Shanken and Weinstein 2006). As expected, all
other factors also have positive means (signiﬁcantly different from zero). Panel B
presents the correlation matrix. The only signiﬁcant correlation between the AMC
factor and the other factors is with the BM mimicking portfolio (HML), with a
correlation of 0.27 (p val\.001). This is not unexpected, as to the extent that BM
is a (noisy) proxy of unconditional conservatism and unconditional conservatism is
negatively associated to conditional conservatism, sorting stocks on BM may
partially sort stocks on Conservatism as well. The rest of correlations are similar to
those reported in recent studies (Petkova 2006; Core et al. 2008).
Table 4 presents results of the estimation of Eq. 1. Parameter estimates are time
series averages of the parameters from 348 monthly cross sectional regressions.
Consistent with prior research the coefﬁcient on Beta is insigniﬁcant, and Size (BM,
Momentum) is negatively (positively) related to excess returns (Fama and French
Table 4 Cross-sectional regressions of future ﬁrm returns
Cross-sectional regression of monthly value-weighted future excess returns on ﬁrm characteristics and
conservatism (average coefﬁcients of 348 monthly regressions)
Ri,t?1 RF,t?1 = a ? b1 Betat ? b2 Sizet ? b3 BMt ? b4 Momentumt ? b5 Conservatismt ? lt
Intercept Beta Size BM Momentum Conservatism
Estimate 1.64 0.07 0.09 0.26 0.27 0.04
t-stat (4.98) (0.41) (1.88) (3.10) (2.91) (4.73)
p-val \0.01 0.68 0.06 \0.01 \0.01 \0.01
Avg. R-sqr 0.04
Nobs 348
Each month from Jan. 1, 1976 to Dec. 31, 2004, the cross-section of future monthly excess returns is
regressed on beta, size, BM, Momentum, and Conservatism. We match annual estimates of the
explanatory variables to monthly returns in the next 12 months starting four months after the ﬁscal year-
end. That is, for December ﬁscal year-ends, we collect monthly returns from April of year t ? 1 to March
of year t ? 2. Monthly excess returns are measured in percentages and are calculated as the raw stock
return less the risk-free rate. Beta is the slope coefﬁcient from the regression of a ﬁrm’s monthly excess
returns on the monthly value-weighted market excess return (from the CRSP monthly index ﬁle) over a
rolling 60-month (minimum 24 months) window ending in the current ﬁscal year. Size is the natural log
of market value of equity measured at the end of the current ﬁscal year. BM is the natural log of the ratio
of book value of equity to market value of equity measured at the end of the current ﬁscal year.
Momentum is the buy and hold return for the 11-month period ending 1 month prior to at the end of the
year. Conservatism is the monthly decile ranks of the three-year average of the ﬁrm-year speciﬁc proxy of
conditional conservatism developed by Callen et al. (2010). Parameter estimates are time-series averages
of the parameters from the 348 monthly cross-sectional regressions. The reported t-statistics are calcu-
lated from the standard errors of these monthly averages following the Fama and MacBeth (1973)
procedure. Continuous variables are winsorized annually at the 1st and 99th percentiles
151992).We report a negative relation between conditional conservatism and average
realized stock returns (Conservatism 0.04, t stat 4.73). In terms of
economic signiﬁcance, this coefﬁcient indicates that moving from the bottom to
the top decile of Conservatism decreases the cost of equity capital by 4.14% per
year. This provides initial evidence that conditional conservatism predicts future
excess returns. However, as noted by Core et al. (2008), among others, the fact that
Conservatism is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in model (1) does not
necessarily imply that Conservatism is a priced risk factor. This method does not
permit disentangling whether the observed effect is driven by investors being
rewarded for risk or simply by mispricing.
The results of estimating Eq. 2 are reported in Table 5 Panels A to C. We ﬁrst
run the model including just an intercept, to see whether ﬁrms in the least
conservative portfolios obtain greater excess returns on average. This is indeed the
case, as for the hedge portfolio the intercept is 0.18 (t stat 1.95), meaning that
the trading strategy of buying the more conservative ﬁrms and selling short the least
conservative ones obtains an average raw return of 0.18% per month, consistent
with the prior evidence of a mean annual premium of around 2%. This negative
coefﬁcient on the hedge portfolio suggests that ﬁrms with high Conservatism earn
smaller returns than ﬁrms with low Conservatism. When we introduce the excess
returns on the market portfolio in the model, the intercept is still signiﬁcant,
showing that the hedge portfolio would obtain a negative abnormal CAPM adjusted
return of 0.16% per month. Finally, when we introduce all the Fama French
factors plus the momentum factor, the intercept is once more signiﬁcant and of a
similar magnitude to what was previously reported. The negative abnormal return of
the hedge portfolio is 0.25% per month; this means that the strategy of buying a
portfolio of ﬁrms in the top decile of conservatism and selling the bottom decile
generates abnormal annual returns of 3.02%. These results show investors reward
more conditionally conservative ﬁrms with a smaller cost of capital.
As previously detailed, we carry out an additional asset pricing test to ensure that
the prior ﬁndings are indicative of conservatism being a priced risk factor. Table 6
contains the results of the two stage estimation method explained in Sect. 3.2 above.
Panels A1, B1, and C1 provide evidence on the ﬁrst stage regression for the three
sets of portfolios. For reference, Panel A1 shows the results of estimating Eq. 3
without including the conservatism factor. Panels B1 and C1 incorporate the
conservatism factor (AMC). The coefﬁcients for RM RF, SMB, HML, and UMD
are similar to those reported by prior work. Regarding the coefﬁcients on the AMC
factor, they are signiﬁcantly positive both in Panel B1 (0.09, t stat 3.07) and
Panel C1 (0.08, t stat 2.65). In all three panels we report the Gibbons et al. (1989)
test on whether the estimated intercepts are jointly zero. The GRS test statistic
should not be rejected if the factors explain excess returns and the model is correctly
speciﬁed. The GRS test statistic is signiﬁcantly different from zero in all panels, but
a more detailed analysis of the individual intercepts reveals that only 3 (2, 3) out of
the total intercepts are signiﬁcantly different from zero in Panel A1 (B1, C1). These
ﬁndings coincide with those reported in other studies (Fama and French 1993;
Petkova 2006; Chordia and Shivakumar 2006; Core et al. 2008).
16The regression coefﬁcients from this model cannot be directly interpreted as
evidence that the factor is or not priced. These coefﬁcients simply reﬂect that the
test assets have exposure to the factors. The results of the second step regression
(Eq. 4), where we directly analyze whether AMC is a priced factor, are presented in
Table 6, Panels A2, B2, and C2. The coefﬁcients for the three Fama French factors
Table 5 Conservatism and future portfolio returns
Time-series regressions of monthly value-weighted portfolio returns on the three Fama–French factors
and a momentum factor (348 months)
RP,t – RF,t = a ? b1 (RM,t – RF,t) ? b2 SMBt ? b3 HMLt ? b4 UMDt ? lt
Conservatism decile Intercept RM RF SMB HML UMD R-squared
Panel A:
Low conservatism: 1 1.02
t-stat (3.71)
c






































Each month, from Jan. 1, 1976 to Dec. 31, 2004 (348 months), all ﬁrm-years in the sample are ranked into
10 deciles based on their Conservatism value. Portfolios of stocks are then formed for each Conservatism
decile. The table reports the estimated coefﬁcients and t-statistics of portfolio regressions of value-
weighted portfolio excess returns on the three Fama–French factors and a momentum factor UMD. RM
RF is excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio. Excess returns equal the value-weighted return
on the portfoliosless the risk free rate. SML is the value-weighted size-mimicking portfolioreturn. HML is
the value-weighted BM-mimicking portfolio return. UMD is the value-weighted momentum-mimicking
portfolio return. RM RF, SMB, HML, and UMD are obtained directly from WRDS. Monthly returns are
measured in percentages. Panel A reports the parameter estimates from a regression of the portfolio excess
returns on an intercept only. Panel B reports the parameter estimates from a regression of the portfolio
excess returns on an intercept and the market portfolio. Panel C reports the parameter estimates from a
regression ofthe portfolioexcessreturns on anintercept andall the Fama–French factorsplusa momentum
factor. Superscripts a, b, c indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively
17Table 6 Two-stage cross-sectional regressions
First stage: Portfolio time-series regressions of contemporaneous excess returns on factor returns
RP,t – RF,t = a ? bRM RF (RM,t – RF,t) ? bSMB SMBt ? bHML HMLt ? bUMD UMDt ? bAMC AMCt ? lt
Intercept RM RF SMB HML UMD AMC Avg R-sqr
Panel A1: Fama–French 25 Size-BM portfolios. Average factor loadings
Coeff. 0.01 1.03 0.49 0.31 0.03 0.90
t-stat (0.23) (74.19) (4.97) (3.54) (4.61)
p-val 0.82 \.0001 \.0001 0.00 \.0001
GRS-stat 2.59
GRS p-val \0.01
Panel B1: Fama–French 25 Size-BM portfolios. Average factor loadings
Coeff. 0.01 1.04 0.49 0.32 0.03 0.09 0.91
t-stat (0.45) (74.67) (4.96) (3.65) (4.87) (3.07)
p-val 0.66 \.0001 \.0001 0.00 \.0001 0.01
GRS-stat 2.24
GRS p-val \0.01
Panel C1: Fama–French 25 Size-Momentum portfolios. Average factor loadings
Coeff. 0.05 1.04 0.45 0.22 0.14 0.08 0.90
t-stat (1.17) (56.25) (5.12) (5.34) (1.71) (2.65)
p-val 0.25 \.0001 \.0001 \.0001 0.10 0.01
GRS-stat 4.43
GRS p-val \0.01
Second stage: average coefﬁcients of 348 monthly cross-sectional regressions of portfolio returns on
factor loadings
RP;t RF;t ¼ a þ d1^ bRM RF þ d2^ bSMB þ d3^ bHML þ d4^ bUMD þ d5^ bAMC þ lt
Intercept bRM RF bSMB bHML bUMD bAMC Avg R-sqr
Panel A2: Fama–French 25 Size-BM portfolios
Coeff. 1.01 0.30 0.26 0.50 2.07 0.57
Shanken t-stat (2.47) (0.62) (1.34) (2.68) (2.47)
p-val 0.01 0.54 0.18 0.01 0.01
Panel B2: Fama–French 25 Size-BM portfolios
Coeff. 0.38 0.29 0.29 0.52 3.43 0.46 0.61
Shanken t-stat (0.69) (0.47) (1.45) (2.73) (3.44) (2.09)
p-val 0.49 0.64 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.04
Signiﬁcance of the increase in R-square with respect to a model without bAMC: p-val: 0.062
Panel C2: Fama–French 25 Size-Momentum portfolios
Coeff. 1.14 0.38 0.46 0.35 0.8 0.85 0.69
Shanken t-stat (2.35) (0.72) (2.32) (1.20) (3.25) (2.92)
p-val 0.02 0.47 0.02 0.23 0.00 0.00
Signiﬁcance of the increase in R-square with respect to a model without bAMC: p-val: 0.058
18and momentum factor loadings are remarkably similar to those obtained by Core
et al. (2008). Panel A2 shows the results of estimating model (4) without including
the AMC factor loading. Panels B2 and C2 contain results for the full model. We
can observe that the coefﬁcient on bAMC is signiﬁcantly positive both in Panel B2
(0.46, Shanken t stat 2.09) and C2 (0.85, Shanken t stat 2.92). The last line of
Panels B2 and C2 contains a test of the signiﬁcance in the increase in R
2 when the
model is compared with a simpler model excluding bAMC as a regressor (that is,
model A2 vs model B2). Although the increase in R
2 is modest, it is signiﬁcant at
conventional levels (p val 0.062 and 0.058, respectively). This evidence is
consistent with conservatism being a priced factor and with investors rewarding
ﬁrms that report conditionally conservative accounting numbers with a reduced cost
of capital (or alternatively, with investors penalizing ﬁrms with more aggressive
reporting).
As an additional batch of robustness tests, we also use as test assets a set of 25
portfolios from the intersection of the quintiles of Size with the quintiles of
Conservatism. Finally, we repeat the tests using as a test asset a set of 100 portfolios
of Conservatism. The untabulated results are consistent across these different test
asset speciﬁcations. For the 25 Size Conservatism portfolios, the coefﬁcient on
bAMC equals 0.21 (Shanken t stat 2.77), and for the 100 Conservatism portfolios
the coefﬁcient on bAMC equals 0.19 (Shanken t stat 2.72). Overall, the ﬁndings of
our asset pricing tests are consistent with the analytical work of Guay and
Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs (2008) in that, holding everything else constant, greater
conditional conservatism is associated to lower cost of equity capital.
5 Robustness tests
5.1 Regression of implied cost of capital on conditional conservatism
An alternative test of the association between cost of capital and conditional
conservatism is to use cost of capital estimates as measured by the expected rate of
return implicit in analysts’ forecasts. Similar to Francis et al. (2004), we model the
association between implied cost of capital and Conservatism and controls as
follows:
Table 6 continued
Panels A1, B1, and C1 present average factor loadings and average R
2 of time-series regressions of
monthly contemporaneous portfolio excess stock returns (stock return minus the risk-free rate) on the
three Fama–French factors, a momentum factor, and the AMC factor. The Size-BM and Size-Momentum
portfolios are downloaded from the Fama–French database at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/
faculty/ken.french/data library.html. The reported t-statistics are calculated from the portfolio-speciﬁc
standard errors of the average parameters (25 coefﬁcients on each variable). GRS statistic is the Gibbons
et al. (1989) test on whether the estimated intercepts are jointly zero
Panels A2, B2, and C2 present average coefﬁcients from 348 monthly cross-sectional regressions of
excess value-weighted portfolio returns on portfolio factor loadings (i.e., the slope coefﬁcients from the
regressions in Panels A1, B1, and C1). The reported t-statistics are calculated from the standard errors of
the average monthly parameter estimates following the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure
19Dlog 1 þ rVL 
¼ a þ bDConservatism þ dDRiskProxies þ cDControls þ l
ð13Þ
where r
VL is a proxy of implied cost of equity capital taken from the work of Brav
et al. (2005). We estimate model (13) in changes rather than in levels because the
changes speciﬁcation reduces the bias introduced by omitted variables that remain
relatively constant over a period of time such as industry variables and ﬁrm speciﬁc
factors. The main coefﬁcient of interest in Eq. 13 is b, which measures the
association between changes in conditional conservatism (Conservatism) and
changes in the ex ante cost of equity capital, controlling for changes in known risk
factors and ﬁrm characteristics. If ﬁrms that increase conditional conservatism
beneﬁt from a lower implied cost of capital, b is predicted to be negative and
signiﬁcant.
15
Unreported results show that the main coefﬁcient of interest b is signiﬁcantly
negative. Overall, these results show that ﬁrms reporting more conditionally
conservative accounting numbers beneﬁt from lower implied cost of equity capital,
after controlling for known risk factors and earnings determinants, consistent with
the evidence previously reported based on asset pricing tests. These results are also
robust to controls for optimism in analysts’ forecasts (Easton and Monahan 2005;
Easton and Sommers 2007) and are available upon request.
5.2 The link between conditional conservatism and future returns volatility
We partly base our expectation that conditional conservatism contributes to reduce
cost of capital on the analytical results of Suijs (2008), who shows that conservatism
is expected to reduce cost of capital through a decrease in future returns volatility.
To empirically address whether this hypothesis holds true in our sample, we analyze
whether current conditional conservatism leads to reduced returns volatility over the
coming year. To do so, we use the following model, which we estimate in a
changes speciﬁcation to reduce the effect of omitted variables bias:
DReturnsvolatilitytþ1 ¼ a þ bDConservatismt þ dDControlst þ lt ð14Þ
whereDReturnsvolatilityt?1isthechangeinthelogofthestandarddeviationof1 year
of daily stock returns ending at the end of ﬁscal year t ? 1. We apply the log
transformationtoReturnsvolatilitytoreducetheinﬂuenceofthehighskewnessofthis
variable.DConservatismisthechangeinourmeasureofconditionalconservatism.As
control variables, we consider the following determinants of future returns volatility:
current returns volatility, the CAPM beta, size, the book to market ratio, momentum,
the volatility of cash ﬂows, the bid ask spread, and earnings smoothing.
15 In model (13) we consider the following risk proxies: (a) the CAPM beta, (b) market capitalization
(size), (c) the book-to-market ratio, and (d) prior price momentum. These risk proxies are measured as
previously described in Section 3. To isolate the discretionary component of the earnings attribute of
interest, Conservatism, in model (13) we control for the same determinants used by Francis et al. (2004):
(a) log of total assets, (b) cash ﬂow variability, (c) sales variability, (d) length of the operating cycle, (e)
incidence of negative earnings realizations, (f) intangibles intensity, (g) absence of intangibles, (h) capital
intensity, and (i) dividend yield.
20Table 7, Panel A, contains the results of estimating Eq. 14. The coefﬁcient on
DConservatism is negative and signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the analytical evidence in
Suijs (2008) that current conditional conservatism reduces future returns volatility.
The economic signiﬁcance is such that a change in Conservatism equal to its inter
Table 7 Association of changes in Conservatism with changes in future returns volatility and earnings
forecast errors
Panel A: Regression of the change in future returns volatility on change in Conservatism and controls
Dep. var: D Returns volatilityt?1 Coeff. t-stat p-val
D Conservatismt 0.024 2.38 0.02
D Returns volatilityt 0.25 4.32 0.00
D Betat 0.07 2.71 0.01
D Sizet 0.01 0.50 0.62
D BMt 0.10 4.10 0.00
D Momentumt 0.03 1.74 0.08
D Bid-Ask spreadt 0.02 2.50 0.01
D CFO volatilityt 0.00 0.30 0.77
D Smoothingt 0.03 1.73 0.08
Constant 0.01 0.25 0.81
Firm and year cluster Yes
R-sqr 0.05
Nobs 25,628
Panel B: Regression of the change in analysts’ forecast errors on change in Conservatism and controls
Dep. var: D Forecast error Coeff. t-stat p-val
D Conservatism 0.23 3.85 0.00
D Forecast variability 2.92 12.57 0.00
D Size 0.73 10.28 0.00
Constant 0.07 3.11 0.00
Firm and year cluster Yes
R-sqr 0.07
Nobs 15,388
Note for Panel A The dependent variable is the change in the log of future returns volatility, measured as
the standard deviation of 1 year of daily stock returns ending at the end of the ﬁscal year t ? 1. The rest
of variables are measured at the end of year t and are deﬁned in Table 1. The sample covers the period
1975–2003
Note for Panel B The dependent variable is the change in the log of analysts’ earnings-per-share forecast
errors. Forecast errors are measured as the absolute value of the difference between the mean forecast
EPS and the actual EPS, scaled by the actual EPS. The forecasts are taken in the 10th month of the ﬁscal
year from IBES summary data. Forecast variability is the standard deviation of the earnings forecasts. We
impose a minimum of three earnings forecasts per ﬁrm-year. Size is the log of the market value of equity.
The sample covers the period 1975–2003
In both panels, coefﬁcients are based on pooled regressions. The t-statistics are based on standard errors
clustered at the ﬁrm and year level (Petersen 2009), which are robust to both heteroskedasticity and
within-ﬁrm serial correlation. All the p-values are based on two-tailed tests
21quartile range (0.26) is associated with a reduction of 0.62% in daily returns
volatility or 9.87% annualized. To put this value in perspective, notice that the
annualized returns volatility is 47%.
5.3 The link between conditional conservatism and analysts’ forecast errors
Our expectation that conditional conservatism contributes to reduce cost of capital is
also based on the analytical results of Guay and Verrecchia (2007), who show that
conditional conservatism is expected to reduce cost of capital through a reduction in
information uncertainty. This reduction in information uncertainty increases the
precision with which investors can assess ﬁrm future cash ﬂows, minimizing the
discount markets apply to ﬁrm value. To empirically test this proposition, we analyze
whether current conservatism, as measured through our Conservatism measure, leads
to reduced analysts’ forecast errors. To do so, we use the following model, which we
estimate in a changes speciﬁcation to reduce the effect of omitted variables bias:
DForecasterror ¼ a þ bDConservatism þ dDControls þ l ð15Þ
whereDForecasterroristhechangeinthelogofanalysts’forecasterror.Theforecast
error is measured as the absolute value of the difference between the mean forecast of
earnings per share(EPS)andtheactualEPS,scaledbytheactualEPS.Theforecastis
takeninthe10thmonthoftheﬁscalyeartfromIBESsummarydata.Weapplythelog
transformation to Forecast error to reduce the inﬂuence of the high skewness of this
variable. DConservatism is the change in our measure of conditional conservatism.
The set of controls includes size (a proxy for the number of analysts following) and
forecast variability. Forecast variability is the standard deviation of the earnings
forecasts. We impose a minimum of three earnings forecasts per ﬁrm year. Including
additional control variables does not signiﬁcantly affect the inferences.
Table 7,PanelB,containstheresultsofestimatingEq. 15.Thereducedavailability
of forecast errors, together with the fact that we take changes in specifying the model,
reduces the sample size to 15,388 observations. The coefﬁcient on D Conservatism is
negativeandsigniﬁcant,conﬁrmingtheanalyticalpredictionsofGuayandVerrecchia
(2007) that conditional conservatism reduces investors’ uncertainty, in this case by
reducing analysts’ forecasterrors.Theeconomicsigniﬁcance ofourresultissuchthat
a change in Conservatism equal to its inter quartile range (0.26) is associated with an
average reduction of 5.8% in the forecast error. To put this value in perspective,
Table 1 shows that the average forecast error is 29%.
6 Summary and conclusions
We empirically test the association between conditional conservatism and ﬁrm cost
of equity capital. We run two sets of tests. First, we study if more conditionally
conservative ﬁrms earn lower expected returns, using asset pricing tests commonly
used in the ﬁnance literature. Second, we analyze the association between
conditional conservatism and a measure of implied cost of capital. Both sets of
tests produce corroborative evidence, showing a signiﬁcant negative relation
22between conditional conservatism and cost of equity capital. This association is
robust to the use of different testing methodologies and measurement procedures.
Our evidence thus conﬁrms the hypotheses of prior analytical research by Guay and
Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs (2008), who argue that conservative reporting leads to
increased information precision, increases in ﬁrm value, and reductions in ﬁrm cost
of equity capital by reducing (1) uncertainty about the amount and distribution of
future cash ﬂows and (2) the volatility of future stock prices.
Our results add to a ﬂourishing stream of empirical research in accounting
conservatism that shows that conditional conservatism is associated to positive
economic outcomes: lower information asymmetry problems (LaFond and Watts
2008), improved investment efﬁciency (Bushman et al. 2007; Ahmed and Duellman
2008), and better governance (Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Garcı ´a Lara et al.
2009a). The documented negative association between conditional conservatism
and cost of capital adds some additional light to the regulatory debate on whether
conservatism should be excluded from the desirable qualitative characteristics of
accounting information. Our results indicate that, without properly enforced
conservatism in accounting, ﬁrm disclosure is less precise. This, in turn, may lead to
greater uncertainty, greater volatility of future prices, lower market values, and
increased cost of capital.
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